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Non-Technical Summary 
In the face of limited carbon budgets, Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs) offer hopes of 
removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. It is difficult to determine whether the prospect 
of NETs is significantly deterring or delaying timely action to cut emissions. This paper sets out a 
novel theoretical perspective to this challenge, enabling analysis that accounts for interactions 
between technologies, society and political and economic power. The paper argues that, seen in this 
light, the scope of NETs to substitute for mitigation may be easily exaggerated, and thus that the risk 
of harm from mitigation deterrence should be taken seriously.  
 
Technical Summary 
This paper offers a new theoretical perspective on the risk that geoengineering interventions might 
deter or delay mitigation (previously typically described as moral hazard). Drawing on a brief review 
of mitigation deterrence (MD) in solar geoengineering, it suggests a novel analytical viewpoint going 
beyond and contrasting with the methodological individualist, managerialist and economist analyses 
common in the literature. Three distinct registers to assist identification and interpretation of 
situations and processes through which MD might arise are elaborated and compared. The paper 
shows that moving from a realist register via a cultural register to a cultural political economy 
register, makes it clearer how and why misperceived substitutability (between NETs and mitigation) 
and narrow climate policy goals matter for MD. We have also identified several plausible 
mechanisms for MD under a neoliberal political regime. The paper argues that MD cannot be 
overcome simply by better informing decision makers (the ‘realist’ response), or even by opening up 
the standard techno-economic framing of climate change and our responses (the ‘cultural’ 
response). The paper also concludes that the entire political regime that has evolved alongside 
specific economic interests is implicated in MD, and that the likelihood and significance of MD 
probably remain underappreciated and understudied.  
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Mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, aiming to stabilise atmospheric GHG concentrations 
and thus control climate risk (primarily by cutting emissions, but also by enhancing natural sinks) has 
been the central goal of climate policy internationally, and in most countries, for decades. Mitigation 
practices are nonetheless expected to deliver also against socio-economic goals, not just 
environmental ones. For example, there is a long-standing agreement that countries bear a common 
but differentiated responsibility to contribute to mitigation. In practice rates of mitigation are still 
sub-optimal to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change. Scientists and analysts agree that 
mitigation should be intensified and accelerated, although views differ on how much is practical and 
how best to distribute responsibility [1,2]. In this context, it seems important to ask of any other 
policy option whether considering or promoting it would help enhance or sustain or might for any 
reason deter or delay desirable levels of mitigation [3].  
For the purposes of this paper mitigation deterrence (MD) is broadly defined as ‘the prospect of 
reduced or delayed mitigation resulting from the introduction or consideration of another climate 
intervention'. Defined this way, MD is not inherently problematic, but potentially causes several 
serious harms which would make it normatively undesirable. Possible harms include elevated GHG 
concentrations or greater climate risk arising from delay or failure (of the alternative intervention), 
and reduced co-benefits or more serious negative side-effects. Either harm might involve a more 
regressive distribution of costs and benefits. For instance, the consequences for global justice [4] 
and intergenerational justice [5,6] of increased climate impacts (unabated by the failed alternative 
intervention) would be grave. The term ‘deterrence’ is here used generically to include both 
intentional and emergent effects,i while the definition (as ‘prospect’ rather than ‘outcome’) also 
allows for the possibility of actions to avoid or reduce deterrence. 
 
Our definition is deliberately general, intended to include a range of possible scenarios, from the 
common fear in the 1990s that a focus on adaptation might undermine mitigation, to the more 
contemporary concern that pursuit of solar geoengineering might discourage more economically 
costly mitigation (often described as ‘moral hazard’ effects).  At this generic level, MD could be a 
product of any type of intervention. It might even arise from an intervention that is a different form 
of mitigation. For example, a proposal to rely on the development of novel clean-energy 
technologies (instead of implementing existing forms of low-carbon energy generation) might imply 
greater uncertainty or delay in emissions outcomes, or a different pattern of side-effects with 
negative consequences for justice. Such concerns with so-called ‘false solutions’ are widely shared 
amongst more radical climate NGOs.  
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Here we consider the potential for MD from the category of climate interventions known as 
Negative Emission Technologies (NETs) or Greenhouse Gas Removal (GGR). Diverse proposals for 
removal of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere range from large-scale soil carbon restoration to 
direct air capture of CO2 using chemical sorbents [7-9]. NETs can be considered as a form of climate 
geoengineering (as a large-scale, intentional, technological, intervention in the climate system with 
the aim of reversing the processes or impacts of climate change). Insofar as the climate issue is 
framed as a scientific and political matter of emissions and GHG concentrations, NETs will appear a 
suitable response.  
The significance of MD by NETs is illustrated well in the development of climate pathways under the 
IPCC. In the absence of adequate mitigation, pathway scenarios have incorporated increasing 
amounts of NETs (typically in the form of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, BECCS). This 
has helped sustain high-level policy conclusions (most recently in Paris [10]) that climate targets can 
be met through a managed transition based on energy efficiency, low carbon energy technologies 
and NETs, without abrupt and (politically and economically) disruptive transformations in energy and 
economic systems [11,12]. In this context NETs may be triggering harmful MD, perhaps in ways 
similar to those hypothesized for solar geoengineering: provision of information about NETs such as 
BECCS appears to reduce public support for mitigation policies [13], yet the future delivery of NETs is 
highly uncertain [2,14,15]. Under the Paris accord, NETs are likely to receive ever more attention and 
interest. Yet very limited consideration has so far been given to their interactions with mitigation 
and the possibility of deterrence (solar geoengineering has been more intensively considered in this 
respect [3,16-18]). It is in this context that we seek to interpret and explain MD. 
The aim of the paper is to argue for a shift to a new analytical viewpoint from which MD can better 
be studied. For this, we build on Markusson et al’s [19] distinction between three generalised 
analytical registers. The registers are generalisations, and as such imperfect representations of any 
field, but useful to move, relatively quickly, the analytical gaze. We discuss MD briefly at each 
register, to illustrate what each register can accomplish and help us compare them and so justify a 
preference for the CPE register.  
This paper first revisits studies of moral hazard in the literature on solar geoengineering as current, 
relevant context for studying MD from NETs, confirming why we think harm from MD may arise with 
NETs despite some dissimilarities with solar geoengineering, and indicating where that literature 
(despite being much richer than that on NETs) is deficient. Fears that solar geoengineering would 
undermine climate policy is a current, relevant example of a more general risk, whereby 
expectations or ‘promises’ of technical solutions [20]ii undermine climate policy (for example see 
Markusson et al [19] regarding CCS). 
We then argue – with reference to the existing geoengineering literature – that the likelihood and 
potential significance of MD by NETs has been poorly understood, and may therefore have been 
underestimated, by analysis frequently located at a realist (individualist, economistic and 
managerialist) register. Shifting to a cultural register, drawing on science and technology studies, we 
show how an understanding of technologies as co-produced by, and co-producing of social contexts, 
can reveal emergent effects and interactions that are not simply the product of individual rational 
decisions. However, the socially-constructivistiii cultural register itself remains inadequate in its 
treatment of materialist politics and economics. Therefore, we instead argue for a cultural political 
economy register [21,22] in which MD is mediated by material economic interests alongside 
framings and social imaginariesiv. We thus argue that shifting from the currently common realist 
register, via a cultural one, to a cultural political economy register puts researchers/analysts in a 
better place to analyse processes that might result in MD.  
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This paper makes several novel contributions to scholarship. Firstly, it explicates the character of the 
three registers in much greater detail than in [19]. Secondly, it discusses what each register can tell 
us about how MD could come about, what can be done about it, and the role of researchers and 
analysts in that process. And, thirdly, as discussed above, it argues that the CPE register is 
preferable.  
In applying a CPE register to explore possible future forms of MD and NETs, we avoid the trap of 
‘speculative ethics’ [23]. While speculation about the ethics associated with future technologies can 
help construct them in particular forms [24], from the CPE register this problem is understood as one 
of (unpoliticised) constructivism. CPE rather examines the emergence of the technology (and its 
associated ethics) in tandem with the political regimev and the power asymmetries within it. While it 
may contribute to the co-construction of the technology it is very clearly not naïve speculation, and 
rather than constructing a particular future, we intend it to enable the consideration and 
empowerment of alternative futures in the present. 
 
2. Solar Geoengineering as a starting point 
If we are to apply lessons from consideration of solar geoengineering, it is important to first consider 
how NETs may differ from solar geoengineering. We highlight three commonly suggested differences 
here [8,9]. (1) NETs may be more costly and slower acting. (2) They act more directly on greenhouse 
gas concentrations rather than temperatures. And (3) they may involve fewer attendant risks and 
uncertainties.  
Although perceptions of solar geoengineering as cheaper might make it more susceptible to MD, 
NETs could also reduce costs to industry, investors and consumers from there being fewer stranded 
fossil assets, in comparison to mitigation. Similarly, while the relative speed of solar geoengineering 
may bolster arguments that climate action is premature, NETs could also enable delay by creating an 
expectation of recovery of carbon from the atmosphere at a future date – at costs then comparable 
to mitigation. Indeed, there is a prima facie case that the way climate pathways modellers have 
embraced such expectations has already helped to sustain inadequate political agreement on 
mitigation in the past decade [2,12,14].  
Secondly, solar geoengineering acts to reduce climate risk by reducing temperatures directly (only 
indirectly affecting atmospheric composition). By acting (2) directly on greenhouse gas 
concentrations NETs are arguably better substitutes for mitigation, and so might again appear less 
likely to generate harms as a result of MD. However, removals are still imperfect substitutes, since 
they may be less certain in their climate effects than emissions prevented, for instance, because of 
the risk of leakage from carbon stores, such as through forest wildfires. Moreover, if NETs were 
incentivised through carbon markets, they would only be adopted as (in practice) an offset for 
mitigation (unless the market cap was reduced equivalently), and therefore risk crowding out actual 
mitigation. 
With respect to (3) risk and uncertainty, although the specific risks arising may differ (for instance, 
the risk of a significant termination effect is limited to solar geoengineering, while the risk of carbon 
leakage from wildfires is specific to afforestation), NETs also involve significant practical 
uncertainties regarding their socially acceptable and sustainable deliverability at scale [25]. 
Moreover, the effects of NETs on ocean outgassing, and of biomass accumulation on albedo are not 
yet fully understood, and some integrated modelling suggests the net climate effects might be 
significantly smaller in the long term than implied by the absolute amounts of carbon removed [26]. 
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Such uncertainties cast doubt on the plausibility of reliable and effective future delivery of NETs, 
which becomes more problematic if mitigation has already been reduced, or not accelerated, in the 
expectation of future negative emissions.  
To sum up, whilst solar geoengineering may seem more susceptible, there is sufficient reason, and 
prima facie evidence, to think that NETs may also cause MD through similar mechanisms, and that it 
might be harmful. It is therefore reasonable to take the literature on MD in solar geoengineering as a 
starting point for discussing MD by NETs. Indeed, efforts to discursively and definitionally separate 
NETs from solar geoengineering [e.g. 9,27] would appear to downplay the similarities of relevance to 
MD, and as we shall argue later, may deliberately or unwittingly represent political shaping of the 
‘promise’ of NETs.   
 
3. A realist register is common in existing analyses of mitigation deterrence 
In conceptualising MD, the literature on geoengineering (primarily addressing solar geoengineering) 
has been dominated by contributions from economics, psychology and philosophy. Scholars in this 
tradition have often adopted the terminology of moral hazard, following [28], and offered a range of 
conceptualizations, analogies and critiques. Moreover, with relatively few exceptions such scholars 
have adopted a realist register, tending to focus on decisions made by autonomous agents or 
institutions, assume that uncertainty can be known and managed, if not eliminated, by such agents, 
cf. [29], and thus that outcomes can be controlled, and to typically reduce phenomena to economic, 
financial or market dynamics, aggregated from individual choices, shorn of any power relations. 
Space limitations preclude more than a brief description of the main themes here (but see [3]).  
Economic and individualistic framings are frequent. Insurance is commonly cited, see for example 
[16-18], as enabling rational risk-taking by autonomous actors: Lin suggests the example of flood 
insurance leading to more building on flood plains as a plausible parallel. Such economistically 
rational analyses also underlie interpretations of the problem as one of economic substitution, e.g. 
[18,30]. Here substitution of geoengineering for mitigation appears rational insofar as they are 
economic substitute goods meeting the same goals. Modelling of climate pathways also often 
includes substitution effects with near-term mitigation rates reduced in response to predicted future 
NETs [e.g. 31-33]. Behavioural economistic conceptualisations – including possible explanations of 
moral hazard arising in information asymmetries between principal and agent, perverse incentives 
and free-rider problems – are also frequently cited [16-18,30,34]. Although here it may be 
understood that actors are only boundedly rational, the framing remains economistic and primarily 
individualistic. Other commentators have applied economistic game theory [35,36], in which 
countries are seen as the relevant agents pursuing their specific interests.   
Some scholars extend psychological insights beyond behavioural economics in a broader account of 
cognitive biases or cultural cognition as a root of possible MD [17,34,37-39]. The focus is less 
economistic, but still typically individualistic. Cognitive biases applied to perceptions of 
geoengineering might imply over-optimism, if geoengineering provides a misplaced sense of control 
regarding the climate problem [17]. Cultural cognition approaches suggest that individual reasoning 
on issues like climate change is distorted in line with cultural identities, in ways that could make 
climate denialists particularly susceptible to the attractions of geoengineering as an alternative to 
mitigation [17,37,40]. Psychological mechanisms also underlie conceptualisations of deterrence as 
risk compensation [16,18,34]. Again, individuals are conceived to adjust their behaviours consciously 
or subconsciously to a similar level of apparent risk.  
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Some researchers have also sought to apply approaches from moral philosophy [16,34,41]. These 
analyses typically seek to clarify the potential harm arising from MD, primarily applying 
consequentialist and deontological approaches rooted in the dominant liberal individualist social 
imaginary [29]. Such moral philosophers, even in deontological variants, tend to avoid economic 
reductionism, but rarely escape the other elements of the realist register. Rather, they highlight 
possible harms in reduced efficiency, misdirected motivations, and mal-distribution of costs and 
benefits. Some philosophical approaches also suggest the possibility of less individualistic forms of 
deterrence, a critical point, which is also highlighted by Corner and Pidgeon [38] in their 
categorization of moral hazard into individual and collective (social or political) forms.  
The realist register has serious analytical limitations. Technologies are understood simplistically as 
material products of science and economic forces, independent of the socio-technical systems 
needed to generate them. A focus on autonomous individuals (either as lone but powerful human or 
institutional actors, or as aggregated sets) obscures the impact of collective, social phenomena like 
norms, institutions, narratives and, crucially, power relations, and the way they shape individuals’ 
thoughts and actions. Understanding collective forms of MD would appear critical where there is 
such limited agency for individuals to understand and act on the risks of climate change and 
geoengineering. Relatedly, a focus on managerial understandings of decision making, where (at 
least, some, powerful) actors can know and manage risks and control the outcome of their 
interventions, obscures the possibility of MD being the result of distributed actions and complex, 
emergent processes that escape any single actor’s ability to predict [42]. Markets are one collective 
institution that has been analysed in the relevant literature, but in an aggregative, economistic 
manner, again based on assumptions about liberal autonomous actors that largely obscure the 
impacts of power relations and unequal social structures. We will argue that shifting (via a cultural 
register) to a cultural political economy register can help overcome these limitations.  
 
4. Key MD mechanisms, as understood at the realist register 
McLaren [3] distilled from the (predominantly solar) geoengineering literature two related 
characteristics of situations where MD can be both likely and harmful. Firstly, the risk of harm 
depends on the perception of substitutability of the proposed approach for mitigation. The greater 
the divergence between perceived and actual substitutability the more significant the risk of harm 
(as then it seems both more likely that mitigation will be reduced or delayed in response, and that 
such reduction or delay will lead to harms). If a proposed intervention is perceived by decision 
makers as equally effective in reducing greenhouse gas concentrations as current options, and 
cheaper, quicker or politically more palatable, it is more likely to be pursued. Even if the intervention 
proves a good substitute in narrow climate terms (effectively reducing greenhouse gas 
concentrations) it may still redistribute social costs and benefits in undesirable ways. Worse, if in 
practice the intervention proves a poor substitute in narrow climate terms then MD might lead to 
more severe climate impacts, as well as other harms.  
Secondly and relatedly, MD is more likely to lead to harm when climate goals are broad or more 
holistic (making it a poorer substitute in practice), rather than narrow. Policy makers may pursue 
particular policies for mitigation for a range of reasons, beyond reducing the risk of dangerous 
climate change. They might aim to create new economic opportunities and markets for low-carbon 
technologies and practices such as carbon trading, or create jobs through green Keynesianism. 
Cutting emissions can also reduce morbidity and mortality from air pollution, which co-benefit 
appears to be strongly incentivising mitigation in countries like China and India. Moreover, designers 
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of climate policy typically aim (if often unsuccessfully) to avoid serious negative environmental or 
social side-effects, and through the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, global 
climate negotiations have sought to place greater burdens on those most able to pay, and having 
most benefited from the use of fossil fuels. Insofar as mitigation carries expectations of other 
beneficial or desirable outcomes, its substitution by alternative policies focused on greenhouse gas 
concentrations or climate risk alone is problematic.  
Figure 1 visually summarises necessary assumptions for the two situation characteristics to be 
intelligible at the realist register, i.e. a realist model of MD. A pair of technologies (the bracketed 
technologies 1 and 2) are here compared by an individual decision maker with regards to their 
respective functionality – relative to assumed climate policy goals – and their mutual substitutability. 
The decision maker’s perceptions (indicated by the eye symbol) of the technology pair may be 
biased and/or not perfectly informed by available evidence (which would be visible to the (notional) 
independent researcher/analyst).  
 
 
Figure 1 A realist MD model 
 
At the realist register, the solution to MD problems is for the decision-maker to be better informed 
of the actual substitutability of the technology options. A well-informed (by ‘objective’ analysts) 
climate policy decision maker would – in the face of possible harm from MD – only deploy NETs as a 
supplement to (desirable levels of) mitigation rather than a substitute.  
Such a response to MD suffers from multiple shortcomings: not only are there significant limits to 
the predictability and knowability of the impacts of future technologies, but there are complications 
arising from diverse ‘rationalities’ motivating action, and power relations that necessarily shape 
perceptions and decision-making [10]. Climate scientists informing policy makers that NETs should 
only be a supplement rather than a substitute for mitigation (given agreed policy goals) is therefore 
unlikely to be sufficient to avoid harm from MD. 
Much scholarship at the realist register overlooks the necessary framing done by experts 
themselves. These framing choices are inescapably subjective, because technology substitutability – 
and so MD likelihood – depends on what climate policy goals are assumed. There will thus always be 
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multiple justifiable ways of framing a given choice between technologies. The frame choice should 
be made explicit, and possible to reflect upon, and to contest; the apparently objective knowledge 
about technology option substitutability needs to be ‘opened up’ [43]. For this, we need to go 
beyond naïve realism and adopt what we can call a cultural register.  
Note that this is not simply an argument for adopting the ‘bounded rationality’ of behavioural 
economics. Such approaches recognize cognitive biases and move away from the ideal ‘rational 
decision maker’ but maintain a commitment to objective assessment of substitutability, and in effect 
restate a claim that by minimising irrationality, the problem is managed. At the cultural register, 
there is a different relation between scientists and decision makers. Scientists are here not just truth 
tellers but also (epistemological) power brokers.  
 
5. Moving to a cultural register 
At the cultural register, we can analyse what kinds of rationalities, and what kinds of framings 
dominate. Climate policy consistently features an established standard techno-economic framing 
embedded in practices and institutions (and anchored in a dominant liberal administrative social 
imaginary, evident across contemporary systems of liberal democratic government) [29]. Users of 
this framing foreground the physical climate system in formulating the problem and the goals of 
policy, and privilege technologies as solution options, highlighting their physical effects and costs, as 
opposed to issues of, say, social justice and power relations [44]. Such framing draws heavily on 
some kinds of evidence (from physical sciences, engineering and economics) rather than others 
(from e.g. critical social science). The standard framing of MD is therefore, unsurprisingly, similar, 
excluding power relations and many justice issues. 
Analysts working in the dominant social imaginary tend to construct technologies as stand-alone, 
isolated tools. This backgrounds how technologies are implicated in social relations and the messy 
political aspects of society, as well as almost all relationships between technologies. In the techno-
economic framing of the realist register, technologies are made commensurable by focussing on 
narrow functionality (e.g. CO2 emissions or reductions), and choices between them are facilitated by 
focussing primarily on economic costs. Not only are single technologies framed, but the relationships 
between them are framed too. 
Insofar as MD arises in misperceived (as described above) substitutability (given broad climate policy 
goals), the cultural register – with its understanding of technologies as socio-technical systems – 
enables us to reflect on the processes in which technologies are socially constructed as being 
functionally substitutable, and their shares of a deployment portfolio economically optimisable. The 
cultural register thus helps us analyse how MD can take effect in the dominant social imaginary, and 
reminds us that alternative framings of the relationships between technologies are possible. Given 
the standard techno-economic framing, any MD mechanism that involves things other than those 
studied by scientists, engineers and economists is largely invisible. At the cultural register, drawing 
on science and technology scholarship, the antidote is to open up the restrictive framing of 
relationships between technologies, and expose other possible interaction effects. 
Figure 2 visually summarises a model of MD at the cultural register. Here there is a range of frames 
through which actors may assess the substitutability of the technology options. Analysis at the 
cultural register, employing reflexivity and deliberation, reveals a dominant social imaginary which 
shapes policy goals and framings of technologies and their inter-relations. Concepts such as 
sociotechnical imaginaries [45] or the sociology of expectations [20, 46] helpfully ‘open up’ framings, 
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revealing how tacit and powerful ‘pictures’ or ‘promises’ of desirable futures often vary, yet also 
profoundly shape socio-technical trajectories in unconsidered and unaccountable ways. 
 
 
Figure 2 A cultural MD model 
 
Whilst work in the dominant liberal social imaginary serves to depoliticise climate policy in favour of 
technocratic responses [47], the cultural register does not fully help us explain the specifics of how 
the dominant social imaginary and expectations of individual technologies interact. Which specific 
technologies get promoted as climate policy options? Under what circumstances do they succeed or 
fail? What power relations do they enable? Moreover, the cultural register does not help us 
understand the evolution of particular political economy regimes and associated social imaginaries 
(e.g. how is the liberal imaginary of government dominant in the first place?), and how envisioned 
technology options are implicated in that evolution, and hence the historical contingencies of the 
framing of technological climate policy options. For this, we need to turn to a cultural political 
economy (CPE) register as we outline below. 
 
6. And from a cultural to a CPE register 
At the CPE register, understanding of social relations begins from a materialist interpretation of 
economic interests and political regimes. For instance, we here conceptualise social relations in a 
Marxian tradition, recognising the need for capital to extract surplus value from labour, to sustain its 
economic and political domination. The ephemeral but rolling maintenance of the conditions for 
such exploitative profit-gathering takes the form of shifting spatio-temporal fixes [48]. These ‘fix’ 
emergent ruptures in or rejections of contested political economic conditions, ‘(af)fix’ them in 
longer-lasting infrastructures and institutions and thereby secure the potential for achieving the 
recurrent ‘fix’ of profitable growth that capitalism systemically demands. But our perspective also 
remains essentially cultural, in that we see dominant political regimes acting through and being 
supported by shared and contested social imaginaries, perhaps even constructing forms of 
hegemonyvi. Specifically, we adopt a non-deterministic and relational Marxian position that sees 
social structure as a complex system that is unstable, dynamic, in need of maintenance – both 
material and ideational – and shaped by historical contingency. This perspective incorporates 
strategic agency, reflexivity and resistance in the evolution of capitalist society as constitutive 
elements of the trajectories of social, political, cultural and techno-scientific change. 
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Crucially, science has become ever more important for the development of new technology, as a 
source of innovation. At this register, science serves to create new objects in which to invest, and 
from which to make a profit. Science serves to open up new capitalist frontiers, to enclose new 
spaces as spatio-temporal fixes for a capital that recurrently requires new avenues for profit. Science 
proposes technical fixes for collectively recognised problems, e.g. climate change. Spatio-temporal 
fixes can in this sense also be defensive, primarily, and at least initially, preserving existing 
investments, rather than opening up new lines of profitable enterprise [19].  
Similarly as at the cultural register, technological expectations [20,46] here circulate amongst 
stakeholders as representations and perceptions of possible futures. Technological expectations also 
become embedded in material practices and hence can, in turn, significantly condition ongoing 
political economic activity. In the case of NETs, this includes pathway modelling practices, as well as 
technology development practices. The expectations also entail framings that foreground some 
things and background others, and come bundled with (more or less explicit) imaginaries of social 
order. Also for this reason, some technological expectations fit better with the social imaginary of 
the dominant political regime, and the two tend to develop in inter-active, contested parallel over 
time. CPE is, thus, clearly not simply a shift in ‘sociological scale’ to the regime level (from specific 
discourses at the constructivist register, or individual agents at the realist register). Rather CPE 
accommodates and motivates analysis at and across multiple sociological scales, transcending and 
incorporating the other registers. In contrast, the ‘cultural’ tends to be set against the ‘realist’ and 
vice versa.  
Yet the regime level is critical to a CPE understanding. We envision that in a dynamically stable 
capitalist formation, mutually supportive dynamic relations subsist between science and technology, 
underpinning in complex cultural and material ways a hegemonic political regime, which in turn 
supports certain kinds of innovation (through an innovation regime favouring technologies that are 
seen as attractive). In other words, technology is understood as a ‘politico-technical’ phenomenon 
[49], in which the political economy is co-constructed alongside the material technology and systems 
thereof. In all parts of the co-evolutionary loop, there is scope for, and need of, action, to reproduce 
and maintain the positive feedbacks that give the loop any stability.  
Of course, different reflective actors diverge in how they perceive their situation and the ongoing 
dynamic, and regarding what they see as desirable goals for which to aim. This also means there are 
multiple points of intervention and resistance around the loop, since the emergent stability is the 
result of multiple diverse inter-relations, not an abstract ‘higher-level’ reality. Intervention is here 
about opening up the framing of specific concrete technologies (and their relationships), but also 
about mobilising actors to challenge and reshape tendential trajectories of system evolution – not 
least through greater strategic awareness of their current positions in existing dynamics of system 
reproduction and transformation. Thus in the CPE model both MD, and interventions to avert it or 
ameliorate its harmful effects, are conceivable.  
The table below summarises the contrasts between the three registers.  
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Table: the three registers 
Register Conception of 
technology  

























Power relational  
 
7. The CPE-MD model 
Working at the CPE register, we see MD as an outcome of the co-evolution of multiple technologies 
(as expectations and perhaps also as development and deployment) with political regimes, entailing 
both social imaginaries and economic blocs. MD is here not just about how policy goals and 
technologies (in isolation or in comparison) fit with a dominant social imaginary, but also how they 
fit with dominant material interests. And since imaginaries and interests are not perfectly aligned, 
the fit with the latter matters too. Therefore, at the CPE register, we need to pay attention also to 
who stands to make (or lose) a profit from proposed NETs, and who from mitigation, and how those 
things are related. This can be from NETs opening up new investment opportunities, or constituting 
defensive fixes to sustain the value of fossil fuel-dependent assets [19,50,51]. Whether NETs are 
perceived as complementary with or substitutable for mitigation may matter, but also whether they 
simultaneously can materially support the political regime or not. See Figure 3 (below) for a visual 
summary of MD at the CPE register. 
 
 
Figure 3 The CPE-MD model  
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Although a range of perspectives exist within a CPE approach (as on the cultural register), in Figure 3 
we emphasize that all perspectives are to some extent situated within the hegemonic political 
regime (represented by their position within the regime cycle). Whilst some actors are clearly more 
influential than others, no one stands free from the ongoing production of power relations and 
framings (developed in a process described by [52] as power-knowledge). This includes 
researchers/analysts, whose only choice is to act strategically like other actors. Researchers/analysts 
may inform decision-makers and strategically open up aspects of reality for challenge, but to 
intervene against MD here may also entail advocating specific framings (closing down) and even 
materially supporting specific actors. 
MD can be expected to emerge in specific ways in different regimes. How might MD therefore 
happen under the existing, specifically neoliberal, political economy regime? Acknowledging that the 
term is often disputed, here we treat ‘neoliberal’ as an ideological belief in the unlimited capacity of 
markets to solve the problems involved in governing human affairs, following [53]. Understanding 
neoliberalism as a hegemonic political ideology takes us beyond the idea of the social imaginary 
discussed at the cultural register, recognising the ideology as part of a political regime, co-evolving 
with a bloc of economic interests, such as oil and gas producers and financial corporations. 
The neoliberal regime with its limitless belief in growth and markets has emerged alongside the 
expansion of seemingly endless, cheap energy supply in the form of oil and gas [50]. In this context, 
the prospect of NET investments suggests a possibility of cleaning up society without the need for 
abrupt changes to how we produce and use energy [contrast 12,54]vii. And in analogy with the 
experience with CCS, this may be enough for some time to sustain the regime, and may in fact even 
work best (for the regime) as long as the technology remains a ‘promise’, rather than a costly 
material investment [19]. There is alternatively scope for NETs to be more directly useful to the 
economic bloc underpinning neoliberalism, as the captured CO2 could be used for enhanced 
extraction of oil and gas [57] or diverted from storage into carbon utilisation, for example in 
synthetic fuels [58]. In either case, on balance less carbon is permanently withdrawn from the 
atmosphere. Moreover, NETs can be expected to function better as a ‘promise’ in this context, if 
they are definitionally separated from solar geoengineering, and the risks (including harm from MD) 
that the latter is now widely presumed to embody. 
The techno-economic, depoliticising social imaginary discussed above, works well in a neoliberal 
political economy, supporting its market focus through tools such as carbon trading. Technologies 
(as opposed to changed habits and practices) are preferred solutions, because they can more easily 
be constructed as commensurable and fungible, i.e. their deployment (actual or prospective) can be 
traded on the same markets. Under neoliberalism, markets are the primary arbiters of whether and 
to what extent technologies are substitutable. Fungibility is easier to construct if technology 
functions are framed narrowly, with neatly standardised effects, cf. [59]. Poor substitutability 
between NETs and mitigation would thus tend to be obscured under a regime favouring market 
solutions, and so increase the likelihood of MD. Technology fungibility, in turn, is easier to construct 
if policy goals (against which technologies are assessed) are kept narrow. Expectations of fungible 
technological solutions thus help sustain a neoliberal political regime, with its hegemonic belief in 
markets. In respect of both the framing of climate policy goals and interventions to meet them, the 
CPE viewpoint suggests ways in which the neoliberal political hegemony might stimulate MD.  
The hope of inclusion of NETs in trading and offsetting systems is part of what has driven 
entrepreneurship in this area. Such inclusion typically requires not only modelling of carbon flows, 
but the establishment of systems for measuring, monitoring, verification and accounting [59-62]. 
Keen entrepreneurs have started selling offsetting services ahead of such systems, potentially 
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prompting their development.viii It might even be that some such commerce thrives regardless of – 
or even best in the absence of – such systems, as for some buyers what matters is an act of faith in 
having sought to offset [63]. The development of sequestration markets, and maybe even ‘carbon 
futures’, fits nicely with a neoliberal regime reliant on financial innovation and experimentation.  
This analysis also makes clear – at the cost of an elaborate re-conceptualisation, complexity and 
much new terminology, and thus a risk of disconnection from the mainstream realist literature and 
policy discourse – ways in which the neoliberal regime benefits from – and co-constructs – a framing 
of climate change as an issue of measurable quantities of greenhouse gases, rather than a more 
complex nexus of cultural, social and economic constructions. Accountable, tradable quantities of 
carbon, convertible into useful products through carbon utilisation and enhanced oil recovery, 
create new markets, with the prospect of new financial instruments and derivatives. A CPE approach 
enables this framing to be contested, while simultaneously being capable of exposing and even 
challenging interests, e.g. those behind denialism, in climate policy.  
One possible objection to our approach to MD might be that it appears to be ‘moving the goalposts’. 
As leading climate engineering researcher David Keith complains of Naomi Klein, ‘she attempts to 
solve the problems of capitalism, rather than those of the climate’ [64]. But the CPE approach 
highlights instead that the setting of the goalposts in particular ways and in particular places by 
powerful interests is part of the problem of inadequate mitigation. In other words, it is not that we 
here ourselves introduce other, broader goals into climate policy, but that we merely highlight inter-
connected issues such as economic transformation or justice and international redistribution. Hence, 
we are unapologetic in understanding the problems outlined here as a normative argument for 
moving the goalposts. Conversely, we are sympathetic to arguments that, if only for strategic 
reasons, climate problems must be analytically separable and capable of being addressed without 
first (or alongside) ‘solving’ capitalism (or neoliberalism more specifically, here). A CPE perspective, 
however, actually affords analysis that remains fundamentally aware of the inter-relations between 
socio-technical change (such as development of NETs) and political economic regimes without 
collapsing the former onto the latter or, therefore, arguing (explicitly or implicitly) that ‘better’ NETs 
can only be developed when problems with the latter are ‘resolved’. Instead, NETs are illuminated in 




We have here set out a new analytical viewpoint, based on cultural political economy, for studying 
MD. The viewpoint offers a distinct alternative to the realist register that is common in the literature 
(and to constructivist challenges to it). The CPE viewpoint promises to add sensitivity to both 
epistemic pluralism (the presence of multiple ways of knowing) and historically contingent societal 
power relations. We have shown that shifting from the realist via the cultural to a cultural political 
economy register promises to improve our understanding of how and why poor substitutability and 
narrow policy goals matter for MD. We have also identified several plausible mechanisms for MD 
under a neoliberal political regime. The situation regarding MD now looks more complex. It is not 
just about insufficiently informed decision makers, or even about the problematic domination of a 
techno-economic framing of the climate change problem and its solutions. Rather an entire political 
regime is implicated in specific ways in making mitigation deterrence possible and perhaps harmful. 
Therefore, most existing analyses may have underestimated the likelihood and significance of MD, 
and we are investigating this in related work. 
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Conversely, however, this added complexity also means there are now more points of plausible 
intervention. It is no longer enough to consider messages to policy makers that NETs should not be 
used as substitutes for mitigation [2,12], nor to ‘open up’ the standard framings that make 
mitigation deterrence a possible outcome. At the cultural political economy register, 
researcher/analysts are part of the inescapably conflictual dynamic through which technologies and 
political regimes co-evolve. They may therefore be more overtly situated – and even engaged in 
foreclosing of debates where they are being ‘opened up’ in troubling new directions – and may 
strategize for better ways of acting in and organising society, including potentially in materially 
subversive ways. For this purpose, we plan in further work to develop a methodology that is capable 
of supporting such strategic reflection [65] and delivering empirically based findings about 
mechanisms of MD. It will be based on scenarios and used in stakeholder engagement, designed to 
produce interventions with the objective of alleviating the MD problem. 
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i  We do not deliberately echo the specialised use of ‘deterrence’ in the strategic military context, although the concepts 
may share some characteristics. 
ii Here we follow in the tradition of science and technology studies scholars such as Mads Borup and Harro van Lente who 
write of a sociology of expectations triggered by promises of technological advancements. 
iii (Social) constructivism is, simply put, the idea that reality is constituted through our perceptions of it. 
iv A social imaginary describes the shared visions, symbols and associated feelings that people have about something. 
v By political regime we mean the social structures and systems of power relations that enable governance over society 
(not necessarily in a single country). 
vi Hegemony is the cultural dominance by a ruling group resulting in a widely shared worldview, which legitimises the 
group’s rule. 
vii Recent modelling studies have concluded that with radical reductions in global final energy use it may be possible to 
achieve 1.5°C without NETs [55] or alternatively, that even with radical behaviour change at least some NETs would still be 
needed [56]. In modelled futures, only pathways with substantial deployment of NETs avoid such politically and 
economically disruptive shifts.   
viii See for example, Nori (online at https://nori.eco/) which is developing entrepreneurial NETs trading using blockchain 
technology.  
                                                          
